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The Laws of Unintended
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When governments intervene in labour relations, whether through
compulsory arbitration, “back-to-work” legislation, union
certification rules, or bans on replacement workers during strikes,
they should weigh the unintended consequences.
NO. 304, JUNE 2010
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INNOVATIONCanadian governments, both federal and provincial, heavily regulate labour relations between
unions and employers. In both the private and public sectors, this government intervention
has unintended consequences on wages and strikes. 
As governments across Canada tackle their deficits, controlling labour costs will potentially be
at the top of their agendas. This makes analyzing the effectiveness of government
interventions all the more important. We find that legislation requiring compulsory
arbitration in  labour disputes involving public employees has increased wages by about 1.2
percent per settlement. Although politicians might view strikes in such situations as
politically costly, they need to consider the long-term effects of arbitrated settlements;
namely, higher labour costs that are borne by the taxpayer. 
Once strikes are under way, many governments have also taken steps to end them. However,
we find that resort to  “back-to-work” legislation reduces the likelihood of a freely settled
contract in the next round of negotiations, perpetuating the cycle of government
intervention. 
Two provinces – British Columbia and Quebec – have bans on using replacement workers
during strikes, and a similar law has been proposed federally. The long-term effect of
replacement worker bans is to increase strike length and duration while reducing investment,
wages and employment. Similarly, the practice of providing reinstatement rights for striking
workers has reduced wages while causing strikes to be more frequent and longer. The federal
and provincial governments with these laws in place should recognize their economic costs
and factor these unintended effects into any cost benefit analysis of the legislation.
For their part,  unions have been seeking to get rid of secret ballots for certification votes since
they view this change as a way to ease union formation. Although removing secret ballots would
likely increase unionized-worker wages, we argue this would be at the cost of more strikes. 
This Commentary provides policymakers with a fresh perspective on their potential actions
and consequences in the  minefield of labour disputes. Whether governments seek to shift the
balance of labour-employer power, end work stoppages or prevent them in the first place,
policymakers should weigh the unintended consequences before acting.
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H
ow employers and workers
represented by unions, in
both the private and public
sectors, agree on the terms of work is
determined by provincial and federal
laws and regulations. This encompasses
rules that govern how unions operate,
work stoppages, and the process of
collective bargaining. 
Strikes, lockouts, and other outcomes of employer-
employee negotiations, however, affect not just
unionized employees – about one in three working
Canadians – but reverberate well beyond the
negotiating parties. Strikes in some public services
can endanger public safety and have significant
economic costs. Private-sector settlements are
important because labour costs are a key factor of
economic competitiveness; legislation that
influences wages or the likelihood of a labour
disruption may affect the competitiveness of a firm
relative to that of firms in other jurisdictions.
Governments in Canada have taken different
legislative paths with respect to making it more or
less difficult for employees to form a union or go
on strike. Some governments have also taken
measures to prohibit the use of temporary workers
to replace workers on strike or have made it easier
for workers to return to work after a strike. Laws
that govern employee-employer labour relations
sometimes are harshly criticized by both employer
and employee groups. These laws have numerous
qualitative interpretations that suggest they may
have a large range of effects. However, there is only
limited quantitative research on the effects of these
laws on workers and employers or on the economy
as a whole.
Nearly every strike by public employees receives
considerable public attention, and the hardships
faced by those who use strike-affected services are
often significant. Governments often remove the
right to strike entirely by requiring disputes to be
resolved by compulsory arbitration, or they
attempt to moderate the effects of a strike by
declaring that certain services are “essential” and
therefore cannot be fully withdrawn, although
labour stoppages may still occur. Governments also
sometimes intervene with “back-to-work”
legislation to force an end to a dispute. Such
government measures, however, often have indirect
consequences. For instance, one of the most
important effects of labour relations laws in the
public sector is on wages, which in 2007
amounted to $161 billion (Statistics Canada
2007), representing (along with benefits)
approximately 70 percent of total public-sector
costs (Eaton 2007). A small change of, say, 0.5
percent in all public-sector collective agreements,
therefore, would increase or decrease total public-
sector costs by $800 million. Other unforeseen
effects of public-sector labour relations laws
include potentially longer strikes and labour
disruptions such as work-to-rule, illegal strikes,
and slowdowns. 
By investigating the lessons from previous
governments’ changes to labour legislation, we
intend this Commentary – which focuses on
legislation governing collective bargaining, labour
disputes, and how employees become unionized
1 –
to provide a more complete examination of the
consequences of such labour legislation than
previously available to policymakers.
2
To preview the results, we find that banning
strikes increases public-sector wage levels
appreciably. Bans on temporary replacement
workers lower wages, contrary to previous
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The authors would like to thank Geneviève Laurence, Charles Philippe Rochon, Catharine Emberly, Sylvie Gratton, Philip Malfara, and Victoria
Hanga of Human Resources and Skills Development Canada and Susan Johnson of Wilfrid Laurier University for kindly providing information
on legislation and the data used in this analysis, as well as the staff at the library of the Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources,
University of Toronto. Participants at the Canadian Economics Association 2009 conference, Colin Busby, Claire de Oliveira, Craig Eschuk,
Morley Gunderson, Andrew Jackson, Susan Johnson, Alex Laurin, Finn Poschmann, Bill Robson, Charles Philippe Rochon, Andrew Sims and
Jiong Tu provided helpful comments. The authors take full responsibility for the work in this paper.
1 We do not examine employment standards or health and safety-related issues directed by legislation. As well, we do not take into account the
legal effects of Supreme Court rulings or International Labour Organization decisions defining freedom of association.
2 Governments’ ability to intervene in collective bargaining disputes may well be limited by the 2007 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
(Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 2007 S.C.C. 27), which found that collective bargaining is
included in freedom of association in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.| 2 Commentary 304
evidence, and increase the likelihood and length of
strikes, as do reinstatement rights for striking
workers. Allowing union certification only
through a secret ballot decreases the number of
strikes and wages of unionized employees. We also
find that emergency back-to-work legislation has a
chilling effect on negotiations in subsequent
bargaining rounds.
Jurisdictions with reinstatement rights for striking
workers – which include the federal government 
and all provinces except British Columbia, New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland and
Labrador – should recognize that such legislation has
the unintended effect of increasing the length of
strikes while lowering wages. 
Provinces that are considering removing the
right to strike of public employees – be they
transit workers, emergency workers, medically
related staff, or otherwise – and requiring all
disputes to go to arbitration should know that
such action likely would increase wages. Likewise,
provinces that are looking to reduce labour costs
in bargained settlements, as Ontario has recently
stated, should consider removing the requirement
that disputes go to arbitration as a way of reducing
wage costs. Lastly, we recommend that any
government that ends ongoing work stoppages
with back-to-work legislation – as Ontario
recently did for employees of the Toronto Transit
Commission and York University, and British
Columbia did for paramedics – should recognize
that such action reduces the probability of
reaching future agreements through normal
bargaining processes and increases the likelihood
that they will have to rely on this thorny, intrusive
instrument again in the future.
Unions and Strikes in Canada
Before discussing the effect of labour legislation on
the Canadian economy, we must first consider the
facts on unionization and labour action in Canada.
Unions
The fortunes and future prospects of unions have
changed in Canada over the past 30 years. The
rate of collective bargaining coverage – the
percentage of workers who are represented by
unions – has fallen in the private sector, from a
peak of 21 percent in 1997 to 18 percent in 2009
(Figure 1).
3 Public-sector union coverage, which,
at about 75 percent, is much higher than in the
private sector, has recently returned to the level of
the 1990s. The overall union coverage rate,
including both public- and private-sector workers,
fell from a high of 34 percent in 1997 to 31
percent in 2009. The drop in private-sector
unionization could be due to a number of factors,
such as globalization leading to greater competi-
tion between unionized and non-unionized
employees, industrial reorganization, a shift toward
a knowledge and services-based economy in which
collective bargaining is less prevalent, and changes
in the laws that govern unions.
Previous analyses of the effect of union
legislation on the private sector with respect to
issues such as strike incidence, wage levels, strike
duration, and investment (see, for example,
Cramton, Gunderson, and Tracy 1999; Budd
2000) are based largely on data from the late
1960s to 1993. Likewise, most analyses of
Canadian public-sector labour legislation (such as
Currie and McConnell 1991, 1996; Gunderson,
Hebdon, and Hyatt 1996) are based on data from
the 1960s through only 1985.
4 In the intervening
years, however, the landscape for labour unions in
Canada has changed considerably, with a far lower
rate of private-sector unionization, a number of
legislative changes, and a more globalized
economy. Businesses, unions, and policymakers
therefore need to understand how these laws affect
labour relations today, rather than in an era when
labour relations were markedly different. 
C.D. Howe Institute
3 Data from 1997 to 2008 are the share of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement with a union, but are not necessarily union
members. Thus, the decline in private-sector unionization after 1997 is even more significant than represented in the figure because union coverage
is an upper-bound level of union representation.
4 Some more recent analyses of Canadian public-sector labour relations cover Ontario’s legislative changes through 1993; see Hebdon and Mazerolle
(2003) and Eaton (2007).Commentary 304 | 3
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Strike Incidence and Length
The average number of strikes per year in Canada
has declined dramatically over the past 30 years
(Figure 2). During the late 1970s and early 1980s,
there were nearly a thousand strikes per year; in
contrast, during the last half of this decade, there
was an average of approximately 200 strikes per
year. Yet, while strikes are becoming less frequent,
they are now longer than in the late 1970s and
early 1980s (Figure 3), especially in the public
sector, where the average strike is now over two
months long. Historically, private-sector strikes
have been longer than public sector ones, but
today the average strike duration is the same in
each sector.
Worker Days Lost 
In Canada, the number of “worker days” lost to strikes
– that is, the number of workers on strike or locked out
multiplied by the length of the work stoppage – is
higher than in most other countries. Looking only at
strikes involving more than 1,000 workers, the United




























































































































Private sector Public sector (right axis)
Figure 1: Union Coverage 1997-2009
Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM database, table 282-0077.
Private Sector  Public Sector 
(% of employees)






New Brunswick 13.0 71.1
Prince Edward Island 8.8 77.3
Nova Scotia 12.8 70.6
Newfoundland and Labrador 21.0 74.5
Table 1: Public- and Private-Sector Union Coverage Rates, by Province, 2008














































Number of public-sector strikes Number of private-sector strikes
Figure 2: Number of Strikes Per Year, 1979-2007
Sources: HRDSC; authors’ calculations.
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Figure 3: Average Annual Strike Length
Source: HRDSC strike database for worker days lost. 2007 public sector employment CANSIM Table 183-0002, private sector employment CANSIM Table 281-0023. Comparable
data for the number of workers under federal jurisdiction was not available. workers per year between 1997 and 2006 (Annis
2008), while Canada lost 242 worker days per year.
5
Even so, this higher number is still substantially below
that of the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
The economic effect of lost worker days can be
significant. Fewer days spent working reduces both
workers’ take-home pay and firms’ profits. Firms
might also reduce their planned capital investment
in anticipation of lower capital investment use
during strike periods. These two effects might
reduce the productivity of both labour and capital,
the two main components of economic
productivity (see Baldwin and Gu 2008).
As Figure 4 shows, between 1979 and 2007, more
worker days per worker were lost to work stoppages
in the public sector (an average of 0.6) than in the
private sector (an average of 0.1). Over the period
1993-2007, lost worker days were particularly high
in the public sector in British Columbia, Quebec,
and Newfoundland and Labrador, which averaged
between 1.2 and 1.5 per worker per year.
6 Except for
New Brunswick, provinces with a high number of
worker days lost in the public sector generally also
had a high number of days lost in the private sector.
Prince Edward Island had the lowest number of
worker days lost in the private sector (less than 0.05
days lost per year), while Newfoundland and
Labrador had the highest rate (0.2 days lost per year).
In both the public and private sector, the
average length of strikes increased between 1979
and 2007 even as the incidence of strikes declined
(Figure 2). What might account for this
phenomenon? One possible factor is the passing
of labour legislation that makes it more difficult to
strike while unintentionally encouraging its
continuation. For example, an essential services
designation that is meant to reduce the effect of a
strike in the public sector might also reduce the
incentive of employers and employees to settle.
Strike behaviour might also be influenced by
changes in wage levels, unemployment, or other
local or national conditions. We attempt to
control for these factors in our analysis in order to
isolate the effect of labour legislation.
Commentary 304 | 5
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5 An exact comparison between the two countries is not possible because of differences in the methods they use to compile statistics on labour
disputes. Since strikes in Canada involving more than 1,000 workers accounted for only about 60 percent of the average of 6.7 million worker days
lost per year between 1997 and 2007, the actual average number of worker days lost per 1,000 workers over that period was 399, not 242.
6 The numbers shown in Figure 4 are for all workers, regardless of collective bargaining coverage; thus, the number of worker days lost per unionized
















































































































































Public worker-days lost per worker (left axis)
Private worker-days lost per worker (right axis)
Figure 4: Average Annual Worker-Days Lost Per Worker,1993-2007
Sources: HRDSC; authors’ calculations.| 6 Commentary 304
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The Effects of Labour Legislation in Canada
As a constitutional matter, provinces have
jurisdiction over labour legislation for both public-
and private-sector collective bargaining, exclusive of
a distinct federal jurisdiction involving
interprovincial industries.
7 Both the provinces and
Ottawa have made numerous changes to legislation
on collective bargaining and dispute resolution over
the past 30 years – see Box 1 for a grouping of
categories and brief descriptions of legislation.
8
In our analysis, we distinguish between public-
sector legislation and legislation that applies to all
workers. Sector-specific legislation usually
determines public-sector labour relations, such as
provincial acts that apply only to police, fire
fighters, healthcare workers, or provincial
employees, while most private-sector employment
falls under the relevant general provincial labour
relations legislation.
9 We do not include the
7 Industries under federal jurisdiction include shipping, airports and airlines, interprovincial and international transport, broadcasting and
telecommunications, banks, First Nations governments, grain handling, uranium mining, and some other employers specifically declared by
Parliament. Approximately 860,000 workers were under federal jurisdiction as of 2004 (Federal Jurisdiction Workplace Survey 2004). Of these
workers, 52 percent were unionized. We indentify contracts under federal jurisdiction in our database by their industry code.
8 We also consider contract reopeners in our empirical estimation as control variables, but do not report the estimated effects of these laws as they
change too infrequently.
9 Public-sector workers are also subject to some provisions of provincial labour relations legislation when sector-specific legislation does not
specifically exempt workers. Thus, in our analysis, we include the effects of specific provisions of general provincial labour codes on public
employees when we believe that the legislation is applicable, but do not report the results, since public-sector wages are still determined only loosely
by general legislation. An example of when this would not apply is legislation influencing the behaviour of strikes (such as reinstatement rights or
temporary replacement worker bans) on workers who do not have the right to strike.
Public Sector
￿ Compulsory arbitration: Workers are not allowed
to strike and unresolved disputes must be settled
through final and binding arbitration. Types of
arbitration include conventional arbitration (where
the arbitrator fashions the terms of the contract) or
final-offer selection (where the arbitrator selects the
final offer of either the union or the employer).
￿ Essential services designation: Workers are allowed
to strike but some portion of workers is legally
obligated to continue providing designated services
(as determined prior to a strike) during the job
action. Procedures for the determination of
essential services vary by province.
￿ Right to strike: Workers have the right to go on 
full strike.
General Labour Legislation 
￿ Conciliation: Third-party intervention in
negotiations from either a conciliation board or
individual between the expiration of a contract and
when a strike can legally begin.
￿ Cooling-off period: The number of days between
the time the conciliation period ends and a strike
legally can begin.
￿ Mandatory strike vote: A majority of union
members must vote in support of starting a strike,
rather than the decision being left to the discretion
of union leaders.
￿ Reinstatement rights: Workers are entitled to
return to their positions after a strike. 
￿ Employer-initiated vote: The employer may
unilaterally (without requesting permission
through the government or labour relations board)
force a vote by employees on whether to accept the
employer’s final offer during negotiations.
￿ Compulsory dues: All employees in the bargaining
unit must pay dues to the union regardless of
whether they are members of the union.
￿ Bans on temporary replacement workers:
Employers are prohibited from hiring short-term
employees or using non-unionized employees
during the course of a strike to replace striking
workers temporarily. 
￿ Secret ballot for union certification: Employees seeking
union certification must hold a secret ballot to deter-
mine if the majority of the voters support forming a
union. Otherwise, unions may gain certification
without a vote by presenting signed union cards that
represent a majority of employees who support
forming a union (percentages vary by province).
Box 1: Categories of Collective Bargaining and Dispute Resolution Legislation 
Source: Cramton, Gunderson, and Tracy. (1999); Currie and McConnell (1991). Commentary 304 | 7
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construction sector because it often falls under a
unique section of provincial labour laws. In
contrast, federally regulated industries fall under
the Canadian Labour Code. 
We expect very different effects in the public
and private sectors from legislation. For example,
secret ballot certification rules should have little
effect on public-sector contracts compared to
private contracts because a large share of the
public sector is already unionized. 
Public-Sector Legislation
Recent legislative changes to public-sector labour
legislation include restrictions on the right to
strike of “essential” public services in
Saskatchewan in 2008 and the full removal of the
right to strike for paramedics in Alberta (see
Appendix Table A1). Nova Scotia also tabled
legislation proposing that health care workers’
right to strike be removed, but a provincial
election and change of government ended the
proposal (Haiven and Haiven 2007). In early
2009, New Brunswick passed legislation
restricting strikes in nursing homes,
10 and both
the cities of Ottawa and Toronto have considered
requesting that higher levels of governments place
restrictions on public transit workers’ right to
strike (Dachis 2008) – indeed, a private member’s
bill to that effect was being considered in the
Ontario legislature at the time of writing.
11
PREDICTED EFFECTS: If governments forbid
workers from going on strike and if a settlement
cannot be freely reached between negotiating
parties, legislation often requires the parties to
settle disputes through a process of neutral, final,
and binding arbitration. There are numerous
reasons to think that compulsory arbitration
might lead to higher wages. First, since neutrality
requires that third-party arbitrators have no direct
financial interest in the terms of their award,
arbitrators might place little weight on employers’
concerns for wage restraint. Second, since
arbitrators are often compelled to follow the
precedence of previous agreements, there might be
positive feedback between settlements and
arbitrated awards. Thus, in an economic
downturn, arbitrated settlements might be slow to
reflect lowered wage and inflation expectations, in
contrast to negotiated agreements, which are more
likely to reflect changes in economic conditions.
Alternatively, since arbitrators tend to follow
settlements and other awards, it is an inherently
conservative process. Thus, a competing
hypothesis is that compulsory arbitration might
reduce wage settlements. In this case, there might
be negative feedback among arbitrated outcomes
during an economic upturn if arbitrators follow
awards from an earlier period of restraint. 
Hebdon and Mazerolle (2003) found that
mandatory arbitration led to an increase in
employer-employee negotiation impasses as high as
20.7 percent of the time. They also found that while
strike ban legislation is likely successful in reducing
the likelihood of strikes it increases the likelihood of
other types of disputes, such as work-to-rule or work
slowdowns (see also Hebdon and Stern 2003). 
The effect on wages of an essential services
designation is difficult to predict. Such
designations often end up in arbitration,
suggesting that they might increase wages. On the
other hand, union bargaining power might be
diminished by the loss of the ability to withhold
public services completely during a strike. We
expect essential services designations to increase
the frequency and length of strikes because the
continuation of basic services makes work
stoppages less politically costly to employers and
less economically costly to unions. However,
because the effectiveness of strikes is reduced as a
bargaining tool, this would be a countervailing
reason not to continue a strike or to strike in the
first place. Table 2 presents a summary of the
expected effects of public-sector labour legislation.
10 See “N.B. law to declare nursing home workers essential,” CBC News, March 31, 2009; available online at: http://www.cbc.ca/canada/new-
brunswick/story/2009/03/31/nb-nursing-home.html?ref=rss.
11 Toronto’s public transit system falls under the jurisdiction of Ontario labour legislation whereas Ottawa’s public transit is regulated by federal
legislation because OC Transpo operates across provincial boundaries. The provincial private member’s bill to restrict transit strikes in Ontario has
been referred to the Standing Committee on General Government as of April 22, 2010. | 8 Commentary 304
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General Labour Relations Legislation
Changes in recent years to provincial legislation
that apply to both the public and private sectors
include the introduction of employer-initiated
final offer votes in Quebec in 2002 and a
mandatory secret ballot for certification in
Saskatchewan in 2008 (see Appendix Table A2).
Alberta is also considering introducing
compulsory union dues after a provincial court
order. There have also been proposals in the
House of Commons to ban temporary
replacement workers for industries under federal
jurisdiction. In the United States, where the
measurable effect of secret ballots in Canada has
significant relevance to US policymakers,
Congress is debating an Employee Free Choice Act
that would allow unions to seek workplace
certification without a secret ballot.
12 In turn,
changes in labour policy of such magnitude in the
United States might renew interest in similar
legislative reforms in Canada. 
PREDICTED EFFECTS: We expect mandatory
conciliation to reduce strike length and strike inci-
dence by assisting both sides to reach an agreement.
Cooling-off periods are expected to reduce the
incidence of strikes by creating a period between the
time mandatory third-party conciliation ends and
strikes can legally begin. Parties might be able to
reach an agreement during this time, reducing the
number of strikes. A policy that reduces the threat
of a strike also might reduce the bargaining power of
unions and, thus, wages. However, longer delays
before a strike can begin might allow firms to
stockpile output, thus allowing them to survive
more frequent and longer strikes.
Mandatory strike votes require that a majority of
voting union members support the strike in a
secret ballot vote before it can legally commence.
We expect this to have a minimal effect on all
outcomes because most unions hold a vote before
a strike starts, regardless of legislation. However,
such legislation might have an impact in
jurisdictions where union leadership is not
responsive to members’ wishes. 
We expect reinstatement rights to increase strike
incidence, strike length, and wages. Reinstatement
rights increase the bargaining power of strikers by
protecting the position they had before going on
strike. Workers would have a greater incentive to
hold out for higher wages and would be more likely
to use the strike option if there were less chance of
losing their jobs in response. On the other hand,
legislation that is especially favourable to employees
and increases strike incidence might reduce
investment by firms in a jurisdiction with reinstate-
ment rights, thus eventually reducing wages.
We expect employer-initiated votes on final offers
to reduce strike incidence because employers likely
would use this option if they thought there was a
high likelihood that workers would accept the
contract. This circumvention of union leadership
might reduce the union’s bargaining power, thus
reducing wages. On the other hand, employers
might appeal directly to workers with the offer of
higher wages.
12 Also under consideration are possible reforms of the current secret ballot system, such as speeding up the voting process or fully removing the
requirement to hold a secret ballot, but requiring that employees mail union memberships; see Kris Maher, “Specter suggests changes to union
bill,” Wall Street Journal, May 15, 2009; available online at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124243752071226041.html. Previous analysis of the
expected effect of the proposed legislation (Layne-Farrar 2009) has methodological limitations that do not allow for an explicit analysis of secret
ballots for union certification. See also Fortin (2009); Johnson (2009); and Sran and Stanford (2009).
Type of Legislation Effect on:
Wages Strike Incidence Strike Duration
Compulsory arbitration uncertain less less
Essential services designation  uncertain  greater greater
Table 2: Expected Effect of Labour Legislation on the Public Sector
Source: Currie and McConnell (1991); Gunderson, Hebdon and Hyatt (1996). Commentary 304 | 9
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Compulsory dues checkoff might increase union
strike funds, thus increasing the length of strikes, and
result in employees seeking higher wages to offset the
reduction in take-home pay diverted to union dues.
Secret ballots for union certification likely reduce
strike incidence and wages. Requiring that
employees hold a secret ballot to form a union
would make it more difficult to form a union than
is the case with “card check” certification, where a
union can be certified with a majority of workers
signing union cards. Secret ballots also reduce the
success rate of union certification, by 9 percent
according to Johnson (2002) and by 21 percent
according to Slinn (2004). Riddell (2004) reports
that the reduction in the union certification rate in
recent years is entirely due to requirements for a
secret ballot on certification, while Johnson (2004)
suggests that the share of the workforce that is
unionized would have fallen by about 15 percent
had Canada imposed secret ballot requirements
uniformly since 1980. We should note that our
analysis does not capture other elements of the
secret ballot process that vary from one province to
another, such as the length of time between
announcing and holding a vote and laws regarding
intimidation of employees. Since secret ballot
requirements lead to fewer certified unions, the
result should be fewer strikes. Moreover, unions
that do form in jurisdictions with secret ballot laws
face greater competition from non-unionized
workers who, because they have less bargaining
power, likely earn lower wages. This, in turn,
should reduce the wages of unionized workers. We
do not expect secret ballots for union certification
to have any effect on the duration of strikes.
13
A ban on temporary replacement workers is
expected to increase the average length of strikes.
Although originally framed as a means to reduce
picket-line confrontations, temporary replacement
worker bans might make an employer more likely
to concede early to a strike (or the threat of a
strike), knowing that recourse to other workers is
not possible, thus reducing strike incidence and
length. On the other hand, workers with greater
bargaining power might see the strike as a more
effective bargaining tool and want to use it both
more often and for longer. The enhanced threat of
strikes is expected to be significant enough to
extract higher wages from employers, although the
countervailing effect of lower firm investment in
jurisdictions with temporary replacement worker
bans eventually might reduce wages.
14
Table 3 summarizes the expected effects of general
labour relations legislation in the private sector.
15
13 Evidence suggests that, unlike firms in the United States, firms in Canada often do not see a large decrease in market value once a union is certified
(Martinello et al. 1995).
14 We do not consider the replacement workers ban that applies federally to be binding, as it is restricted to replacement workers that “undermine”
unions – a definition that is rarely enforceable.
15 Our expectations of the effect of general labour legislation are based largely on Cramton, Gunderson, and Tracy (1999). Other interpretations exist, however,
that might not be fully incorporated in this discussion. Given the competing theories, the effect of labour legislation is thus largely an empirical question.
Type of Legislation Effect on:
Wages Strike Incidence Strike Duration
Mandatory conciliation none less less
Cooling-off period (per day) less none none
Mandatory strike vote none none none
Reinstatement rights greater greater greater
Employer-initiated final offer vote option none less none
Compulsory dues  greater none greater
Secret ballot for union certification  less less none
Ban on temporary replacement workers greater greater greater
Table 3: Expected Effect of Labour Legislation on the Private Sector
Sources: Adapted from Budd (1996); Cramton, Gunderson, and Tracy (1999); and Johnson (2009).| 10 Commentary 304
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Data and Methodology
Canada is an ideal country when it comes to study-
ing the effects of union legislation: not only does it
possess comprehensive data on strikes and union
contracts, it also has different jurisdictions with
different types of legislation that change over time. 
Data
Human Resources and Skill Development Canada
(HRSDC) collects and distributes a number of
datasets on wages and strikes that we use in this
Commentary, as follows:
￿ Public- and private-sector strikes: information
on the name of the company affected and the
narrow industry classification of the business,
the union name, dates of strike start and end,
how the strike was ended, the number of
workers involved in the strike, and the city (or
cities) and province the strike was in.
￿ The means by which a contract was settled:
through a work stoppage, bargaining,
arbitration, provincial legislation, mandatory
conciliation, other possible outcomes, or a
combination of these outcomes. 
￿ Private- and public-sector wages: information
on the name of the employer, the broad
industry classification of the employer, the
union name, the date the contract was settled,
the effective date, the expiry date, and,
importantly for our analysis, a unique
identifier for each employer-union pair.
Nominal wage information includes the
previous wage level and the annual wage
adjustments for the first three years as well as
the average wage adjustment over the course
of the contract.
The data we use provide information on
bargaining that cover approximately 1 million
workers every year. See the Appendix for more
detail on the data used in this analysis. 
Methodology
The provinces provide a natural experiment to
analyze the effect of labour legislation on
outcomes such as wages, employment, the
likelihood of strikes, investment, and other
factors. When a single province changes its public-
or private-sector labour legislation, we can see
what happens in that sector and compare the
effects to the situation in other provinces that did
not institute a change. 
In the public sector, provinces apply the same
type of legislation to different types of employees,
allowing us to generalize about the effect of the
legislation without confusing the effect as being
specific to a province or sector. To assess the effect
of the legislation, we use regression analyses. Since
provinces often make specific legislative changes 
at different times from other provinces, we can
isolate the effect of the change in labour legis-
lation by controlling for observable economic
factors and unobservable characteristics of the
union, employer, or the specific job. The other
factors controlled for in each regression are
reported in the relevant tables.
16
When new legislation comes into force at the
exact same time as other changes, the results
should be interpreted with some caution.
17 For
example, Quebec introduced a number of
legislative changes in 1978, Alberta made
numerous changes in 1988, Ontario in 1995, and
British Columbia in 1987. If multiple laws change
at the same time, our empirical analysis cannot
determine which law is responsible for the changes
in wages or strikes. However, some types of
legislation – specifically, secret ballot laws,
reinstatement rights, and temporary replacement
worker bans
18 – are expected to have more
16 We apply fixed effects in the tests of public- and private-sector wages. We apply the fixed effects to union-employer pairs, which have a unique
identifier that tracks negotiations over time, because we expect that characteristics inherent to such pairs will persist over time. We use fixed effects
by province in one measure of strike incidence, but we do not have an identifier for union-employer pairs in the strikes dataset. We use other
regression methodologies for other outcomes, depending on the type. See the Appendix for details. Regular ordinary least squares results are
available from the authors. In most cases, OLS results for wages were not statistically significant for most labour legislation. 
17 This affects only one out of every five observed changes to legislative rules, however, this overlap in the data does not affect the interprovincial
components of the analysis.
18 These three specific laws were reformed at the same time in the same province in one out of every five cases of legislation change.significant effects than other legislation




We first analyze the effect of legislation regarding
the right to strike of public-sector employees.
The Effect on Wages
The true test of the effect of compulsory
arbitration on wage levels in the public sector
would control for factors inherent to a specific
bargaining group for reasons not observed in the
data – for example, higher wages for specific
services, cities, employers, or militant unions. We
look at how wage levels change when a bargaining
group changes from the right to strike (or another
type of legislation) to compulsory arbitration or
essential service designation (see Table 4).
20 We
find that compulsory arbitration increases real
(constant dollar) wage levels by 1.2 percent, but
only at the 10 percent level of statistical
significance – that is, although banning strikes has
a measurable effect on wages, it is weak in a
statistical sense. We also find that an essential
service designation has a negative effect on wage
levels after controlling for the existence of other
types of legislation.
The Effect on Strike Duration and 
Other Work Stoppages
The designation of a public service as essential
reduces the political costs to governments and
unions of not providing the service. We expect
such reduced political pressure to resolve disputes
to result in longer and more frequent strikes. An
essential service designation increases the length of
strikes by approximately 60 percent, although the
result is only marginally significant and in some
specifications not significant at all.
21 No other
legislation has a statistically significant effect on
the length of public-sector strikes. Public-sector
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19 Many labour legislation changes in Quebec were introduced by the Parti Québécois, hence some of the effect we find may be the effect of
investor flight from Quebec in response to the sovereignty movement. As a test of this, we ran additional regressions excluding Quebec.
Replacement worker bans lose statistical significance (which may be because this eliminates two-thirds of the observations affected by
replacement worker bans), but reinstatement rights do not. 
20 We include indicators of whether a bargaining unit is under a “duty-to-bargain” requirement or a “choice-of-procedure” requirement. Very few
contracts are influenced by these provisions, however, and results are rarely significant, so we do not report them here.
21 Since there is not a sufficient number of strikes in sectors under compulsory arbitration to establish the effect on strike length, we do not report
this result.
Sector-Specific Legislation Change in the
Level of Real Wages
(%)
Compulsory arbitration 1.2*
Essential service designation -2.1**
Other controls Real provincial wage (log), provincial unemployment rate, contract
duration, bargaining unit size, year, previous contract bargaining
outcome, previous wage level, existence of general labour legislation
Bargaining pair fixed effects yes
Observations 7,104
R-squared 0.41
Table 4: The Effect of Public-Sector and General Legislation on Public-Sector Wage Levels, 1978-2008
* Statistical significance level of 10%.
** Statistical significance level of 5%.
Sources: Authors’ calculations from Statistics Canada and HRSDC. See appendix.| 12 Commentary 304
strikes occur in approximately 2.2 percent of the
contracts in our dataset, and we find that an
essential services designation does not significantly
affect the likelihood of a strike.
22
Private-Sector Legislation
We now turn to the effect of provincial and
federal labour codes on wages, strikes, and strike
duration in the private sector. 
The Effect on Wages
We assess the effects of different kinds of general
labour legislation on private-sector real wages.
(Table 5).
We find that reinstatement rights have a highly
significant negative effect on wages: although the
legislation guarantees that workers are able to
return to their jobs, the consequence of this
provision is to reduce wage levels by 5.3 percent, a
result similar to that found in Budd (1996). 
We investigated the effect of replacement
worker bans over a period that includes a long
time before and after such legislation was
introduced in Ontario and British Columbia in
1993, and we find that such bans reduce wages by
about 3.6 percent, contrary to both our
expectations and the findings of previous
literature. Earlier studies, covering the time
between the introduction of bans in Quebec in
1978 and in British Columbia and Ontario in
1993, found that the effect – or merely the threat
– of a ban increased wages (Cramton, Gunderson,
and Tracy 1999; Gunderson 2008).
23 Thus, the
long-term effect of temporary replacement worker
bans might have set in only after 1993. The
possible intuition behind these results is reduced
investment – as Budd and Wang (2004) find –
because firms leave jurisdictions with legislation
that makes them more likely to be affected by
strikes with no recourse to alternatives. This, in
turn, could put downward pressure on wages.
24
While replacement worker bans are popular with
unions and might achieve the original goal of
reducing picket-line violence (Savage and
Butovsky 2009), which we do not measure, these
results show that, in the long-term, the effect on
wages is negative.
Requiring a secret ballot for union certification
also has a significantly negative effect on wages for
union members. Such a provision is expected to
make it more difficult for employees to organize
and to leverage collective bargaining to seek higher
wages. We find that, over the past 30 years, wages
have been approximately 1.7 percent lower when a
secret ballot is required to form a union.
25 These
results might underestimate the dampening effect
of secret ballots on wages because the dataset
includes only wage agreements for unions that
have already formed. The effect seen here is thus
likely the result of greater competition between
unionized and non-unionized workplaces driving
down wages. The effect of lower wages seen in
workplaces that do not unionize might be even
more significant.
We find that mandatory strike votes and laws
allowing employers to force employees to vote on
a final offer lead to higher wage levels, perhaps
because employers subject to these laws offer
higher wage packages to appeal directly to
workers. 
Finally, we find no statistically significant effect
of requiring employees to pay union dues, falling
just short of the 10 percent significance level. 
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22 This effect is statistically significant only at the 15 percent level of confidence, which is below a standard threshold that verifies the existence of
an effect.
23 One possible explanation for this is that the introduction of the ban coincided with an increase in wages in Quebec that might be explained by
factors other than replacement workers.
24 A Chow test of the on replacement workers before and after 1993 shows the coefficients are indeed different.
25 Analysis of the periods before and after 1993 shows that the effect has remained largely the same during periods of both growing and declining
union coverage. However, the effect after 1993 is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level of confidence. The coefficient stays largely the
same, suggesting the same effect, but with less accurate estimation.Commentary 304 | 13
The Effect on Strike Incidence
Although the number of strikes has declined, some
policies – such as legislation that makes strikes less
costly – might be counteracting this fall. Alternatively,
laws such as secret ballot rules that make it more
difficult for unions to form, reduce the number of
workplaces able to legally strike thereby reinforcing
the decline in strikes. As a test of the effect of labour
legislation on strikes, we conducted an analysis of the
number of strikes per month in a province and the
number of strikes per firm (see Table 6).
26
We find that, on average, there were
approximately 0.72 strikes per province per
month, and that the number of strikes per month
per province decreases with mandatory
conciliation and the introduction of a secret ballot
for union certification. These are the expected
results, but the effect is weakly statistically
significant. In contrast, banning temporary
replacement workers increases strikes by 0.11 per
month per province, an increase in strike
incidence of about 15 percent. As expected, the
introduction of a secret ballot reduces the number
of strikes in a province, by about 18 percent.
Mandatory strike votes have an effect on the
number of strikes that is far larger than we
expected. This is likely because all provinces now
have had such legislation for at least the past
decade, so that it is impossible to tell if the
changes in strikes that occurred nationwide were
actually caused by the legislation. Thus mandatory
strikes votes likely do not have as large an effect
on strikes as the above results suggest.
Our second test of the incidence of private-
sector strikes looks at strikes per firm. Our results
confirm those of Duffy and Johnson (2009) –
namely, that bans on temporary replacement
workers and reinstatement rights significantly
increase the likelihood of strikes. Contrary to
expectations, however, compulsory dues reduce
strike incidence. With a provincial average of
0.028 strikes per thousand firms each month,
27
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26 Specifically, we used a Poisson regression for strikes per month per province and an ordinary least squares regression for the number of strikes per province
per month per million firms. The results are the same regardless of whether or not provincial fixed effects are included. See the Appendix for details.
As one reviewer suggested, we have also conducted this test using the number of strikes per number of bargained contracts (because of the falling
unionization rates, there are relatively fewer employee groups that have the right to strike). The results do not change for major legislation (bans on
replacement workers and reinstatement rights) and do not switch signs for other legislation.
27 For context, there were 144,500 firms in Alberta, 351,100 in Ontario, and approximately 1 million in Canada in 2003, the last year with firm counts.
Type of Legislation Change in the
Level of Real Wages
(%)
Mandatory conciliation 0.1
Cooling-off period (per day) 0.4***
Mandatory strike vote 2.8***
Reinstatement rights -5.3***
Employer-initiated final offer vote option 1.8**
Compulsory dues -1.7
Secret ballot for union certification -1.7***
Ban on temporary replacement workers  -3.6***
Other controls Bargaining pair fixed effects, real provincial wage (log),
unemployment rate, year, contract duration, number of employees
Number of observations 4,260
R-squared 0.41
Table 5: The Effect of Legislative Changes on Private-Sector Real Wages, 1978-2008
** Statistical significance level of 5%.
*** Statistical significance level of 1%.
Sources: Authors’ calculations from Statistics Canada and HRSDC. See appendix.| 14 Commentary 304
the introduction of mandatory conciliation
reduces this number by 0.012, a reduction of
almost half. Bans on replacement workers increase
the number of strikes each month for every
million firms in a province by 0.0092, a one-third
increase. Likewise, reinstatement rights
significantly increase the likelihood of a strike by
approximately two-thirds.
Considerable caution should be exercised in
interpreting the results of legislation on strike
incidence. Legislation is often introduced in areas
with particularly high or low levels of strike
incidence as a way to change the balance in
bargaining, and is thus endogenous to the
outcomes we are measuring. For example,
provinces with already high strike levels – possibly
those with high unionization rates due to either
industrial make-up or other legislation – might
introduce a ban on temporary replacement
workers as a means to reduce strike levels, thus
creating a spurious relationship between strike
levels and legislation. Further research is needed to
definitively identify the relationship between
strike incidence and legislation.
The Effect on Strike Duration
We now turn to a test of how legislation affects
the number of days a strike lasts. Over the entire
30-year study period, temporary replacement bans
have increased average strike length by
approximately 60 percent (Table 7). This result is
similar to what previous studies have estimated
prior to 1993 (see Cramton, Gunderson, and
Tracy 1999) and to the finding of Duffy and
Johnson (2009), although the latter analyze
aggregate provincial monthly strike days whereas
we use the length of each individual strike.
We find that mandatory conciliation increases
the average strike length by more than 40 percent,
suggesting it has the exact opposite effect on strike
duration as intended. This might be the result of
its having successfully reduced the incidence of
strikes that would have been solved relatively
quickly, leaving those that are more difficult to
resolve to begin with. Hence, it might be incorrect
to say that mandatory conciliation causes strikes
to be longer, but rather that it changes the nature
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Change in the Number
Change in the Number  of Strikes per Thousand Firms
Type of Legislation of Strikes per Month per Province per Month per Province 
Baseline, at the mean of variables: 0.72 0.028
Mandatory conciliation -0.14* -0.012**
Mandatory strike vote 0.44*** 0.0047
Reinstatement rights -0.05 0.019***
Employer-initiated final offer vote 0.02 0.00150
Compulsory dues 0.04 -0.020**
Secret ballot for union certification -0.13** 0.0015
Ban on temporary replacement workers 0.11** 0.0092***
Other controls Provincial unemployment rate; provincial unemployment
rate growth, year, season, number of employees (log);
existence of first contract arbitration legislation and re-
opener legislation, real provincial wage
Number of observations 3,671 2,622
R-squared 0.41
Table 6: The Effect of Legislative Changes on the Likelihood of a Private-Sector Strike, 1978-2008
*  Statistical significance level of 10%. ** Statistical significance level of 5%. *** Statistical significance level of 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations.Commentary 304 | 15
of strikes that do occur.
28 Each additional cooling-
off day mandated by legislation also results in a
slight increase (2.3 percent) in strike length. 
Reinstatement rights increase strike length by
nearly 50 percent. Again, the result that strikes are
longer when the negative consequences of striking
are less severe is not surprising. However, this is a
different result than that found in Duffy and
Johnson (2009), suggesting that reinstatement
rights have different effects on the aggregate
amount of days of strikes in a province than on
the length of individual strikes. The average strike
is about 60 days in length, but we find that
replacement worker bans and reinstatement rights
increase the length to about 90 days. 
Mandatory strike vote rules reduce strike length
by 28 percent. Requirements for secret ballots for
union certification increase strike length by a
relatively small 17 percent, a much smaller effect
than other types of legislation and is of weak
statistical significance.
Other Effects
Labour legislation has other effects on the
economy beyond those on wages or strikes. The
longer-term effect of legislation can be reduced
business investment as employers fear higher costs
or more frequent and damaging strikes. As well,
companies might hire fewer people in response to
higher wage costs.
29 Recent evidence shows that
bans on temporary replacement workers have
reduced provincial investment by approximately
25 percent, with the effects especially pronounced
in the first five years of the introduction of the
policy (Budd and Wang 2004). Budd (2000) also
shows that the employment rate declines by 1.28
percentage points after the introduction of a ban.
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28 In the regression, we also include first-contract arbitration, contract re-openers, employer-mandated strike votes, and compulsory dues. The effects
of most of these other types of legislation are statistically insignificant. We also included first-contract arbitration legislation, which had a
statistically significant impact on strikes length. However, we can not assess the validitiy of this result since we do not know which strikes were
subject to this policy because there is no identifier as to whether a contract is the first one negotiated. Results are available from the authors.
29 On the other hand, Martinello et al. (1995) find that increased unionization, as fostered by card-check legislation, has had little effect on firm
profitability in Canada.
Type of Legislation Increased Length of Strikes
(%)
Mandatory conciliation 41.2***
Cooling-off period (per day) 2.5*
Mandatory strike vote -28.9***
Reinstatement rights 47.4***
Employer-initiated final offer vote 11.3
Compulsory dues 3.5
Secret ballot for union certification 17.1*
Ban on temporary replacement workers 58.6***
Other controls Real provincial wage and unemployment rate; number of workers on
strike (log); year, season, industry; length of previous strike (0
otherwise), province, union affiliation, contract re-openers,
compulsory dues
Number of observations 9,688
R-squared 0.084
Table 7: The Effect of Legislative Changes on the Length of Private-Sector Strikes, 1978-2008
*  Statistical significance level of 10%. *** Statistical significance level of 1%.
Sources: Authors’ calculations from Statistics Canada and HRSDC. See appendix.| 16 Commentary 304
Were a ban to be applied to Ontario, Budd
estimates the employment rate would fall by 1.3
percentage points (from the February 2010 level
of 61.1 percent to 59.8 percent), which, in a
population of 10.8 million, would imply the loss
of 137,000 jobs. Conversely, using the same data,
we estimate that the removal of current temporary
replacement worker bans would increase
employment by 47,000 jobs in British Columbia
and by 80,000 jobs in Quebec.
30
Back-to-Work Orders and Emergency
Legislation
Provincial governments occasionally respond to
strikes by public workers (and, in rare cases,
private workers) with an order to return to work.
These “back-to-work” orders may compel
employees to accept the most recent offer from the
employer or to seek compulsory arbitration.
Provinces may also intervene before a strike
happens, although we are unable to distinguish
between a province’s intervening after a strike or
before one has a chance to begin. We are also
unable to distinguish between different types of
provincial orders, and so use the term generically.
Since 1978 there have been at least 88 instances
in which a province or the federal government has
legislated striking or locked-out workers back to
work. A single back-to-work order (through
legislation or other means) can affect a large
number of contracts, as evidenced by the total of
712 agreements that have been affected by
provincial orders since 1978. The number of
agreements so affected, however, has fallen
significantly since the late 1970s, as Figure 5
shows. Among recent examples of such orders are
British Columbia’s intervening in strikes by
teachers in 2005 and paramedics in November
2009, and Ontario’s ending of strikes by Toronto
Transit Commission employees in April 2008 and
York University staff in January 2009. Ontario
often intervened to end strikes by teachers during
the 1990s and early 2000s, while Quebec imposed
terms in 2005 on a broad range of public-sector
employees to avoid a strike. The federal
government has also intervened in cases such as
postal strikes, public-service strikes, and rail and
port strikes under federal jurisdiction.
31
C.D. Howe Institute
30 Authors’ calculations from Statistics Canada’s Labour Force Survey, February 2010 (released March 12, 2010).







































Figure 5: Number of Public-Sector Agreements Affected By Back-to-Work Orders
Source: HRSDCCommentary 304 | 17
Contracts settled with provincial orders have real
wage settlements that are 1.7 percentage points
below otherwise similar contracts (Table 8). This is
not surprising, since workers who go on long or
contentious strikes that end by provincial decree
likely walk out in response to contracts with very
poor terms. It thus might be that low wage offers
increase the likelihood of back-to-work legislation.
However, the effect on the subsequent contract
after a union is legislated back to work is that wage
agreements are higher than otherwise similar
contracts, by about 0.7 percentage points, only
partly compensating workers for the reduced wages
of the prior contract. 
The net effect: real wage levels compared to
otherwise similar contracts are lower after back-to-
work legislation. Wage levels eventually decrease
to 2.9 percent below otherwise similar contracts
by the time of the next contract, making the total
reduction in take-home pay significant.
A back-to-work order also changes the likely
outcome of the next round of bargaining. We
examined how a contract is settled in the current
contract dependent on how it was settled in the
previous contract (the most common outcomes
are legislated back to work, freely negotiated
without a work stoppage, or settled through
arbitration) (Table 9). The table reports log-odds
ratios: a ratio over 1 indicates an increase in
likelihood, a ratio below 1 indicates a reduction in
likelihood.
32 For example, a ratio of 3.41 suggests
the likelihood of a back-to work order to settle the
next contract is 3.41 times higher if the current
contract is settled by a back-to-work order. If the
previous contract was settled by a work stoppage,
the next contract agreement is about half as likely
to be freely negotiated (row 1, column 1).
Arbitration in the previous contract reduces the
likelihood of a freely negotiated next contract, but
increases the likelihood that the province will
intervene or use arbitration in the next contract.
Likewise, a previous back-to-work order more
than triples the chance of arbitration or a back-to-
work order and reduces by two-thirds the chances
of a freely negotiated settlement in the next round
of negotiations.
These results suggest that back-to-work
legislation negatively affects the ability of labour
and management to take responsibility for
fashioning their own solutions to problems by
increasing their reliance on third parties and
postponing negotiations to the next round. If the
two sides of the agreement know the province will
make the hard decisions for them, they have no
reason to do so themselves. Back-to-work
legislation may be appealing as a way to resume
public services, but its long-term consequences
could be negative.
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32 We use a logit regression; see the Appendix for details.
Percentage Point  Change to
Change in Real Wage Real Wage Level 
(%)
Legislated in current contract -1.7*** -1.1***
Legislated in previous contract 0.7*** -2.9***
Other controls Provincial unemployment rate, number of employees,
contract duration, labour legislation
Previous wage increase yes no
Previous wage level no yes
Real provincial wage levels no yes
Real provincial wage growth yes no
Bargaining pair fixed-effects yes yes
Number of observations 4,298 4,298
Table 8: The Effect of Provincial Back-to-Work Legislation on Real Wage Settlements and Real Wage Levels
*** Statistical significance level of 1%.
Sources: Authors’ calculations from Statistics Canada and HRSDC. See appendix.| 18 Commentary 304
Conclusions and Policy
Recommendations
The findings we present in this Commentary have
implications for labour relations in both the
public and private sectors that the federal and all
provincial governments should heed. 
Public-Sector Labour Relations
Governments can reduce their labour costs by
reducing their reliance on compulsory arbitration.
Although strikes by employees providing some
services currently subject to compulsory
arbitration might be politically costly, the long-
term effects of higher costs paid by taxpayers
might offset any temporary loss of services.
Governments concerned with the increasing
length of strikes should also reconsider the recent
trend toward the designation of “essential
services,” which we find reduces the incentive for
both sides to reach an agreement and likely
prolongs strikes. However, the wage costs of the
designation model are smaller than compulsory
arbitration.
Emergency legislation has significant side-effects
that should be considered before such legislation is
passed. Freely negotiated settlements are less likely
in the future after the introduction of back-to-
work legislation. Unions that are ordered back
have less bargaining power after the first
introduction of “back-to-work” legislation, which
reduces wages and wage adjustments in the future.
Policy thus should aim to facilitate free bargaining
between parties and rely minimally on
government intervention.
Private-Sector Labour Relations
Bans on temporary replacement workers were
designed to reduce picket line violence. In this
respect there is only anecdotal evidence that they
may have been successful. We found, however,
that these bans have significant negative
consequences. Although wages do increase at first,
the longer-term effect is to reduce wages, perhaps
as a result of long-term decreases in employment
or investment because of the negative long-term
effect of such bans on the economy. Bans also
increase both the length and likelihood of strikes. 
Only British Columbia and Quebec currently
have bans on temporary replacement workers.
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario,
Quebec, Prince Edward Island, and the federal
government all have reinstatement rights
legislation in effect and should take into account
lower wages and longer strikes in any cost-benefit
analysis of this policy. 
Governments considering introducing or
removing the requirement to have a secret ballot
on union certification should also heed the
significant and measurable effect of this provision
on wages. Unions have fought to remove secret
ballots for certification votes to ease union
formation, and while the higher wages for workers
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Outcome of Current Contract
Freely Bargained Arbitration Provincial Order
Previous Contract Outcome (log-odds ratio)
Work stoppage 0.48*** 1.89** 1.41
Arbitration 0.62*** 2.36*** 0.68
Provincial order 0.33*** 3.10 *** 3.41 ***
Other controls Labour legislation, year, season, region, industry, real provincial
wage growth, provincial unemployment rate, real average wage
increase in previous contract, previous contract duration (log days)
Number of observations 7,087 7,052 4,822
Table 9: Change in Odds of Current Contract Outcome Based on Previous Contract Outcome, public sector
** Statistical significance level of 5%. *** Statistical significance level of 1%.
Note: A ratio over 1 indicates an increase in likelihood, a ratio below 1 indicates a reduction in likelihood.
Sources: Authors’ calculations from Statistics Canada and HRSDC. See appendix.Commentary 304 | 19
that result from greater unionization due to easier
union certification might be an attractive prospect
for some policymakers and politicians, they come
at a cost to firms and lead to more strikes, as
shown in Manitoba, Quebec, Prince Edward
Island, and New Brunswick, which do not require
a secret ballot. 
Governments also might want to reconsider
their approach to mandatory conciliation and
rules regarding strike votes and compulsory dues.
As a result of these provisions, the number of
strikes has fallen substantially over the past few
years, but the average length of strikes has
commensurately increased. Likewise, mandatory
periods before strikes begin might have the
unintended consequence of making strikes longer.
What is true of all the types of labour legislation
we discuss in this Commentary is that they often
have unintended consequences. Whether the
legislation is to end strikes, prevent strikes by
public-sector workers, or change the balance of
union-employer bargaining power, there is a
possibility of an effect on wages or labour
disruptions. It is up to policymakers to determine
whether the unintended and long-term
consequences of the legislation they propose are
worth the benefits they seek. 
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This appendix provides further detail on the
data and methodologies used in the paper. All
operations were performed in the STATA
statistical package, version 10.
Control Data
The contract-level data discussed above are
merged to a number of data sources by province
and month. Real provincial wage levels are
computed using 2002 real wage levels.
33
CANSIM Table 281-0022 gives hourly wages by
province from 1961 to March 1983. The hourly
wage data are extended to later years using the
index of wages by month and province from
CANSIM Table 281-0009. The wage levels for
PEI from 1983 on are from CANSIM Table
281-0004 and pre-1983 wage levels are missing
and calculated using the average of other
Maritime Provinces. We use the natural
logarithm of provincial wages in our regressions.
Provincial CPI uses CANSIM table 326-0020,
where 2002 is the base year. We calculate
monthly unemployment by province from
CANSIM table 282-0001. 
Contract Data
Human Resources and Skill Development
Canada (HRSDC) collects and distributes a
number of datasets on wages and strikes used in
this paper.
There were approximately 5,300 private-
sector contracts negotiated between January
1978 – the first month of the dataset – and
April 2008, which is the last month that wage
and strike data could be matched to other
supporting economic data. The wages dataset
only provides wage information for bargaining
units that contain at least 500 workers. If
bargaining units over 500 employees are
structurally different from bargaining units
smaller than 500 employees, the results from this
analysis may not be applicable to smaller firms.
34
Campoletti, Hebdon, and Hyatt (2005) show
that strikes are rarer, although longer, for
employers with fewer than 500 workers. We are
thus looking at the sub-sample of bargaining
units most likely affected by strikes and where
strikes are more likely to be economically
significant because of their size. Larger firms are
also more likely to be national firms, with more
choice as to location of production and are
likely more sensitive to provincial labour
legislation than smaller firms. The strikes dataset
contains information on approximately 10,000
strikes where at least 4 worker-days were lost,
thus containing both large and small firms. 
We have information on the means by which
a collective agreement was settled for 8,366
private and 8,380 public agreements. Outcomes
are available for nearly all agreements over 500
workers and 2,479 public and private
agreements with less than 500 employees. We
merge outcomes with wage agreement
information in agreements with more than 500
workers.
The contract-level data provide wage-level
and annual negotiated settlement data. We
calculate the real hourly wage in the contract by
applying the average annual increase of a
contract to the previous wage level as reported
in our dataset. We then take the real hourly
wage in 2002 terms using the CPI at the time
the contract is negotiated. We use the natural
log of the real hourly wage in all regressions.
Our wage database does not provide comparable
union/non-union wage levels.
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34 Further, as a reviewer pointed out, there may be a selection bias if some types of legislation have the effect of reducing the number of
employees, thus making firms in jurisdictions with this legislation less likely to report wages. The cutoff of 500 employees is an economically
arbitrary cutoff. We have conducted a Heckman selection test on the linear regression of private-sector real wages and real wage growth. The
result of the selectivity test was found to be zero, indicating that self-selection can be ignored. 
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Each collective agreement in the public-sector
wages and strikes dataset is assigned a service
sector, as shown along the left-hand side of
Table A1, based on the broad industry category
reported by HRSDC. Specific keywords in the
employee description are used to assign workers
to narrower categories within the broad sector
definitions. 
However, we cannot distinguish between
different types of arbitration. Conventional
interest arbitration allows arbitrators to fashion
awards, while final offer arbitration forces the
arbitrator to choose the final offer of either the
union or the employer. We only examine the
effect of arbitration in general. We also have no
measure of the percentage of workers covered by
essential services designation. The percentage of
workers covered by essential services designation
may have an effect on wages or strikes. 
A further caveat is that the labour cost we
have reflects only wage adjustments and wage
levels. We do not have information on benefit
levels or pensions. However, we find in our
dataset that wage agreements are generally five
times more likely than benefits to be the
reported issue of contention in negotiations.
HRSDC reports that wage levels or adjustments
are the causes of more than 50 percent of strikes
with reported issues, while benefits are the next
most common dispute, representing 13 to 15
percent of disputes.
Information on changes in legislation comes
from various sources from the Labour Law
Analysis unit at HRSDC. We rely on previously
existing literature on the dates that compulsory
arbitration, choice of procedure and the right to
strike was extended to specific sectors as well as
for general labour legislation.
35 We then
identified when specific sectors are assigned an
essential services designation.
36 We assume that
legislation only influences agreements if it is in
effect on the day the agreement is settled.
37
Another concern is that the imipact of legisla-
tion also depends on how it is administered not
just the letter of the law.
Statistical Analysis
We use regressions, as is common in many
empirical analyses. The exact methodology we
use differs based on the outcome being
measured. All regressions use a ‘dummy variable’
equal to 1 when legislation applies to a contract
or province.
Wages
The real hourly wages test uses a fixed-effects
regression. This controls for effects that are
specific to a bargaining pair. This method also
controls for effects, such as the province or the
sector, that do not change over time. The
dependent variable is the log of real hourly wages.
The interpretation of the dummies for the
existence of legislation is that when the legislation
is in effect the reported coefficient represents the
percentage change in real wage levels. Standard
errors are clustered at the bargaining pair level to
correct for error structures inherent to the
bargaining pair. Weights for provincial
population or the number of contracts settled in a
province are not used. 
Strike Duration
This analysis uses the log of the number of days
that a strike lasts as the dependent variable. The
indicator and calculation of whether a strike
occurred previously is determined by identifying
strikes in the same union, employer and city.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
35 Given the difficulty in assessing the exact date when legislation takes effect and the true nature of legislation (as shown in Currie and
McConnell (1991), Gunderson, Hebdon and Hyatt (1996) and Currie and McConnell (1996), for example) we rely on third-party 
definitions of legislation to the greatest extent possible. 
36 This is based on our interpretation of labour legislation created by HRSDC Labour Law Analysis through the annual "Highlights of Major
Developments in Labour Legislation" going back to 1980 and Adell et al. (2001).
37 See Appendix tables A1 and A2. The tables report only the year when legislation cames into force, however we use the exact date that 
legislation came into force in our analysis.| 22 Commentary 304
in the regressions, as there is no consistent
bargaining pair identifier in the dataset nor are
there many repeat strikes in a bargaining pair
that would distinguish fixed effects from OLS. 
Strike Incidence
This section uses two regressions techniques
applied to two measures of strike incidence.
First, the number of strikes per month per
province is calculated by summing the number
of strikes in a province per month. This is again
merged to provincial wage and unemployment
data that controls for economic factors. Fixed
effects are applied at the provincial level. A
Poisson count regression controls for the fact that
many provinces will have no strikes in a month.
We also use an OLS regression for the count of
the number of strikes per thousand firms per
month, using firm level counts per province
provided by Susan Johnson (see Duffy and
Johnson 2009 for details on this data). However,
firm counts are not available for the federal
jurisdiction, PEI, or for years after 2003, resulting
in a lower number of observations in this analysis
compared to other methods used in the paper. 
Industry level controls are not available for
either regression; hence this analysis cannot be
conducted for public-sector strikes that depend
on sector identification. 
Back-to-work Likelihood
We use a logit model to calculate a change in the
odds of a contract outcome based on previous
contract outcomes. A logit model is used when
the dependent variable is an indicator of which
of two outcomes. Table 9 reports three logit
regressions, with the outcomes being whether
(or not) there is a provincial order, arbitration,
or a freely bargained outcome. This uses public-
sector wage level and agreement contract data
merged to HRSDC indicators of contract
outcomes (freely bargained, arbitrated, reached
after a work stoppage, reached in mediation, or
settled by provincial order are the most common
outcomes). We use a dummy variable of 1 to
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